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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Annotated 10-3-1106 (6) (a). This is an appeal from the decision of the 
Sunset City Appeal Board entered on April 17, 2007. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. There was not sufficient substantial relevant evidence to establish that 
Stewart Becker was under the influence of alcohol in violation of Sunset 
Cities Rules and Regulations? 
Standard of review: "When reviewing a formal adjudicative proceeding the 
standard of review set out in Utah Code section 59-1-610 applies. The court 
must review the Commission's finding of fact under a "substantial 
evidence" standard. See Utah Code Ann Section 59-1-610 (a) (1996). In 
other words, the court of appeals must uphold those findings of fact that are 
supported by substantial evidence, or "that quantum and quality of relevant 
evidence which is adequate to convince a reasonable mind to support a 
conclusion. The court of appeals must review the Commission's conclusion 
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of law for correctness. See Section 59-1-610 (1) (b). Yeargin Inc. v. 
Auditing Div of the Utah State Tax Comm'n, 20 P 3rd 287, 291 (UT 2001). 
"Whether certain evidence is relevant is a question of law, reviewed under a 
correction of error standard. " State v. Gonzalez 822 .2d 1214, 1216 (Utah 
Ct.App.1991). 
2. Whether the Sunset City appeals board relied solely upon hearsay evidence 
in finding that Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol content of .04 in violation 
of Sunset City policy. The standard of review for decisions of the Appeals 
Board shall be on the record to determine "if the appeal board abused its 
discretion or exceeded its authority. "UCA 10-3-110-6(5) (C), Salt Lake City 
Corp. v. Salt Lake Civil Serv. Comm'n, 908 P.2d 871, 874 (Utah Ct. 
App.1995). Under this standard, reversal will not be granted unless the 
decision exceeds the limits of reasonability." State v. Larsen, 865 P.2d 1355, 
1361 (Utah 1993) see also Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938 
(Utah 1993). 
3. Whether the Sunset City Appeals Board abused its discretion by failing to 
grant Mr. Becker's request for continuance and to obtain legal counsel? The 
standard of review for decisions of the Appeals Board shall be on the record 
to determine "if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its 
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authority. "UCA 10-3-110-6(5) (C), Salt Lake City Corp. v. Salt Lake Civil 
Serv. Commyn,908P.2d871, 874 (Utah Ct. App.1995). Under this standard, 
reversal will not be granted unless the decision exceeds the limits of 
reasonability." State v. Lars en, 865 P.2d 1355, 1361 (Utah 1993) see also 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch, 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). 
4. Whether the Sunset City Appeals Board violated Officer Becker's 
Constitutional Right to a meaningful hearing including the right to confront 
witnesses? The standard of review for constitutional questions is that no 
deference should be given to the Appeals Board because constitutional 
challenges constitute questions of general law. The Appeals Boards decision 
regarding constitutional challenges is reviewed for correctness; Harmon v. 
Ogden City 171 P.3rd 474, 477(UT. App .2007) citing Questar Pipeline Co. 
v. Utah State Tax Comm'n 817 P.2d 316, 317-18 (Utah 1991). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STAUTES, ORDINANCES AND 
RULES AND REGULATIONS OF WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS 
DETERMINATIVE OR OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE 
Constitution of State of Utah Article 1, Section 7 Declaration of Rights. 
Constitution of United States-Bill of Rights Amendment V. (Rights of Persons) 
Section 10-3-1106 UCA 
Sunset City Policy Personnel Policies and Procedures 14.2.1 
Sunset City Policy Personnel Policies and Procedures 14.7.1 (c) 
R714-500-4 through 7 (Rules and Regulations of State of Utah) 
MARSHALLING THE EVIDENCE 
The challenged findings on this appeal are whether there was competent 
evidenced to establish that Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol level equal to or 
greater than .040 in violation of Sunset City policy and whether Stewart Becker 
was denied his constitutional right to confront witnesses and to a fair hearing and 
to be represented by counsel as a result of the Sunset City Appeals Boards refusal 
to grant a continuance based on good cause shown. 
MARSHALED EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE FINDING OF THE 
SUNSET CITY APPEALS BOARD 
1. On April 1, 2007 Officer Becker arrived on shift and met with Sgt. Arbogast 
Sgt. Arbogast smelled a 'strong odor of alcohol' on Officer Becker. Sgt 
Arbogast request Officer Becker to blow into a PBT (Portable Breath Test) 
which registered .045 (R. p. 122). 
2. On April 1, 2007 Utah State Troopers Michelle McLaughlin and Arlow 
Hancock were at the Sunset City Policy Department to reset the clock on the 
breathalyzer machine and came in contact with Officer Becker. Both troopers 
could smell an "odor of alcohol" coming from Officer Becker and his patrol car 
(R. pp. 136-141). 
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3. Officer Becker acknowledged taking two stiff drinks with about two and one 
half shots of liquor in each before going to bed at approximately 8-9 a.m, on the 
morning of April 1, 2007(R. pp.122, 124-125, ). 
4. Officer Becker acknowledged speaking with the two Highway patrol troopers 
on April 1, 2007 and that he used some hand sanitizer and breath mints in an 
attempt to help mask the odor of alcohol. He admitted that he felt somewhat 
uncomfortable and knew they would have noticed the odor (R. p. 122). 
5. Both Highway Patrol officers noticed the odor of alcohol on Officer Becker, 
and reported it to Sgt. Arbogast who indicated that "he was aware of the 
problem." (R. p. no numbering on page. Page following 136-141). 
6. Officer Becker acknowledges that when he took a portable breath test (PBT) the 
result was .045 (R. p. 172). 
7. Officer Becker was aware of Sunset City personnel policies 14.7.1 (h) defining 
being under the influence with a blood alcohol content of 0.04 (R. p. 172). 
8. Officer Becker previously acknowledged to Chief Ebom that in his usage of the 
portable breath test it has proven to be accurate (R. p. 126,173). 
9. Officer Becker acknowledged a blood alcohol level of .12 before going to bed 
and going to work five hours later (R. p. 173). 
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lO.On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent 
Notice to Stewart Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was 
scheduled on May 16, 2007 (R pp.48, 157) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the May 17,2007 decision of the Sunset City Appeals 
Board, upholding the termination of Stewart Becker, a Sunset City police officer. 
On April 3, 2007 Stewart Becker, a Sunset City police officer, appellant 
herein was terminated by the Sunset City Chief of Police for being intoxicated, 
within the definition of the Sunset City policy definition, when reporting to duty. 
Mr. Becker's blood alcohol content was .045. The blood alcohol content was 
determined by the use of a portable breathalyzer test (PBT) (R. p. 122). It is 
appellant's position that a PBT is not competent evidence to support termination. 
On April 5, 2007 Mr. Becker filed an Appeal with the Sunset City Appeals 
Board (R 244). 
On April 16, 2007 a hearing was held before the Appeals Board. Officer 
Becker requested a continuance based on inadequate notice and the fact that he was 
not represented by counsel. The hearing proceeded with only Stewart Becker and 
the Sunset City Chief of Police offering testimony. (R. pp. 157-186) 
On April 17, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board issued its decision 
affirming Officer Becker's termination. (R. p. 244) 
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On May 11, 2007 Officer Becker filed an Appeal of the Sunset Appeals 
Board with this court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Stewart Becker, appellant, has been employed as police officer by the Sunset 
City Police Department for two years. During the one year period prior to April 1, 
2007 Officer Becker had been assigned to the grave yard shift working from 
midnight until 6 a.m. On the morning of April 1, 2007 Stewart Becker worked his 
final 'grave yard shift" getting off work at 6 a.m. This was Officer Becker's first 
"short shift" being required to report back to work at 2 p.m. (R. p. 160). As was 
his practice, and as a sleep aid before going to bed, Officer Becker consumed two 
drinks and went to sleep at approximately 9 a.m. (R. pp. 122,124-125. 160). 
Officer Becker arrived at the Sunset City Police Department at 
approximately 2 p.m. on April 1, 2007. During a conversation with Sgt. Arbogast 
the Sgt. could smell an odor of alcohol on Officer Becker. Sergeant Arbogast asked 
Officer Becker to take a portable breath test, hereinafter referred to as "PBT" in 
spite of the fact that they were standing near the department's certified breath 
intoxilyzer (R. p. 122). At the time Officer Becker was requested to take the 
"PBT" two Highway Patrol Officer were present to reset the clock on the 
intoxilyzer (R. p. 122). Both officers indicated that they could smell the odor of 
alcohol on Officer Becker (R. pp. 136-141). Officer Becker was "absolutely 
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shocked" that the "PBT" registered .045 (R. p. 160). When he arrived at work 
Officer Becker had no idea that he had any detectible amount of alcohol in his 
system (R. p. 175).When he took a second "PBT" at his residence less than one 
hour later the "PBT" registered .012 (R. p. 160) 
On April 2, 2007 an apparent "pre-termination hearing" was conducted at 
the Sunset Police Department (Record p. 124). 
On April 4, 2008, at 1:15 P.M., Officer Becker was notified of a meeting to 
be held in Chief Eborns' office at 1:30 p.m. At this meeting Officer Becker was 
advised of his termination (Record p. 128). A termination letter dated April 3, 2007 
was given to Officer Becker (Record 132). 
On April 5, 2007 Officer Becker filed an appeal with the Sunset City 
regarding his termination (R. p. 7). 
On April 10, 2007 the Sunset City Appeals Board, by Registered Mail, sent 
Notice to Stewart Becker, informing him that the hearing on his appeal was 
scheduled on May 16, 2007 (R pp.46, 157). Mr. Becker never received notice of 
hearing but learned of the scheduled hearing on the morning of May 16, 2007, the 
day of the hearing (R 158). On May 16, 2007 Officer Becker attended the hearing, 
without counsel. Officer Becker advised the Appeals Board that he had just learned 
of the hearing and it was his intention to "cover every base possible" (R. p. 157). 
One of the bases that Officer Becker intended to "cover" was the fact that his 
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termination was based on the bias of the Chief of Police and Sgt. Arbogast. Officer 
Becker did not know how to subpoena witnesses or how to present his defense 
without the assistance of an attorney. He requested a continuance to allow him 
sufficient time to prepare and to be represented by counsel. He represented that he 
had a scheduled appointment with his attorney on Wednesday (R pp. 157-158). 
Officer Becker's request for continuance was denied (R157-158). The only 
testimony at the hearing was from Officer Becker and the Sunset City Chief of 
Police. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I. 
The Sunset City Appeal Board rendered a decision that was not based on 
competent evidence to support the department's contention that appellant was 
intoxicated while on duty. 
POINT n 
The Sunset City Appeal Board impermissibly relied solely upon hearsay 
evidence to support its finding that Officer Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol 
content in his blood system of .04 or greater. 
POINT III 
The Sunset City Appeal Board abused its discretion and authority by failing 




THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD WAS NOT BASED UPON 
COMPETENT SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ESTABLISHING THAT 
APPELLANT WAS INTOXICATED WHEN HE REPORTED TO DUTY 
Officer Stewart Becker was terminated because it was determined by the use 
of a portable breathalyzer (PBT) that he was intoxicated at work. The (PBT) 
indicated that Officer Stewart Becker had a blood alcohol content of .045. The 
intoxication level established by city policy is 0.04. See Sunset City Corporation 
Personnel, Policies and Procedures-Section 14.7.1 (h) which provides: 
h. Under the Influence means when an employee is affected by 
a drug or alcohol or the combination of drugs and alcohol to the extent 
that it affect his or her ability to perform their job in a safe manner. 
An employee testing positive for any of the above mentioned illegal 
drugs, or whose test detects a Blood Alcohol Content (BAC) of 0.04 
or greater, shall be deemed under the influence. 
The literal lynch pin and only evidence that could establish a blood alcohol 
level in Officer Becker's blood stream, above the .04 level set by the City to 
establish intoxication, was the results of an inadmissible, unreliable and 
unverifiable PBT test result that is not authorized or approved by Sunset Cities 
drug testing procedure which requires that "All drug testing and results obtained 
under the requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by 
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the City Administrative Assistant or his/her designee, Sunset City Policy Personnel 
Policies and Procedures 14.2.1 and 14.7.1 (c) authorizing a urine test. 
14.2.1 Sunset City prohibits the use, possession and/or 
distribution on its premises, facilities and/or work places of any of the 
following: alcoholic beverages, intoxicants and narcotics, illegal or 
unauthorized drugs (including marijuana), and related drug 
paraphernalia. In addition, a city employee will not be allowed to 
report for work under the influence of any drug, alcoholic beverage, 
intoxicant or narcotic or other substance (including legally prescribed 
drugs and medicines) which will in any way adversely affect his or 
her working ability alertness, coordination, response, or adversely 
affect the safety of other on the job. 
Such use, possession, distribution, or impairment during 
working hours (breaks and lunches included) and/or on City premises 
will be grounds for disciplinary action, up to and including 
termination. All drug testing and results obtained under the 
requirements of this policy will be coordinated with and authorized by 
the City Administrate Assistant or his/her designee. All such 
activities will be kept confidential. (See also R. p. 211) 
14.7.1 (c) Drug/Alcohol Testing is an analysis of a urine 
specimen provided by the employee. (See also R. p. 213) 
In this case a urine specimen was not obtained from Officer Becker pursuant 
to the Sunset City drug and alcohol policy under the direction of the Assistant City 
Administrator as required by the policy. Sunset City Policy does not authorize a 
breath "PBT" test but specifically provides for a urine test. Counsel cannot identify 
any cases where a court has accepted the use of a "PBT" as substantial competent 
evidence to support a finding of intoxication. Further counsel cannot identify any 
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cases where a court has authorized the "substitution" of a testing method 
specifically required by a City policy. 
Assuming Sunset City policy somehow allowed "PBT" analysis of a breath 
alcohol test rather than a urinalysis, evidence was not introduced to establish that 
the "PBT" was approved as a certified breath alcohol testing instrument within the 
requirements of R714-500-4 Regulation of the State of Utah1 which requires that 
all breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah law enforcement officers, 
to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be approved by the department. No 
evidence was introduced to establish that the department has approved the use of 
"PBT's" for evidentiary purposes. The administrative law judge, who ruled on the 
use of the "PBT" during the unemployment compensation correctly, determined 
that a "PBT" was not admissible as evidence to establish intoxication (R. pp. 74-
81). See also Appendix setting forth R714-500-4, R714-500-5, R714-500-6, and 
R714-500-7). 
Further, while there is "universal acceptance of the reliability of 
[breathalyzer] evidence, Layton City v. Watson, 733 P.2nd 499,500 (Utah 1987) 
(quoting, Murray City v. Hall 663 P. 2nd 1314, 1320 (Utah 1983), such reliance is 
premised upon the operation of the testing device Layton City v. Peronek 808 P. 
1
 This is an example that had Officer Becker been represented by counsel at the hearing, counsel would have 
objected to the introduction of the "PBT" and additionally would have preserved a hearsay objection to the test 
being offered through a witness that did not administer the test and was not present when the test was conducted. 
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2nd 1294, 1299-1300 (UT. App. 1990). Even if this particular "PBT" was 
approved by the Department of Public Safety, which it was not, there was no 
evidence that the PBT was operating properly, had been maintained and was 
operated on this occasion by a qualified operator as required by R. 714-500-6 &7. 
(See Appendix) In fact, the Sunset City Chief of Police testified at another 
hearing that "he did not know how long it had been since the PBT used here was 
tested prior to the test given to the claimant" (R. p. 81). The fact that the 
department had no record of testing additionally precludes the admissibility of the 
test results pursuant to R. 714-500-5 D. (2) which requires the department to, 
among other things; maintain test records (R. p. 78). Officer Becker testified that 
"PBT's" are not admissible in court and that when they have errors they are on the 
high side (R. p. 161). 
Even if one were to assume that "PBT" test results were admissible as 
competent evidence the fact that the test results were introduced through the 
hearsay statements of the Sunset City Chief of Police, who was not present when 
the test was administered, denied defendant's constitutional due process right of 
meaningful confrontation without any showing of good cause when Sunset City 
chose to make its case through the Chief of Police, who had only limited 
knowledge, rather than the person who was actually involved. See. Layton City v. 
2
 This is another illustration where, had appellant been represented, counsel would have objected and attempted to 
education the Appeal Board regarding competent evidence and the city policy to rely on urine testing 
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Peronek 808 P. 2nd 1294, 1299 (UT. App. 1990).3 Additionally Section 10-3-1106 
UCA (4) (c) provides: 
(4) an employee who is the subject of the discharge, 
suspension, or transfer may: (a) appear in person and be represented 
by counsel^ (b) have a public hearing; (c) confront the witness whose 
testimony is to be considered ; and 9d) examine the evidence to be 
considered by the appeal board. 
At a minimum, due process requires the right to confront and cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, unless the hearing officer specifically finds good cause for not 
allowing confrontation Id, 1299 citing U.S. v. Holland 850 F.2d 561, 564 (5th 
Circuit 1988) citing with approval Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). 
The decision of the Appeal Board was arbitrary and capricious. 
POINT II 
THE DECISION OF THE APPEALS BOARD WAS BASED SOELEY 
ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE AND WAS ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
The PE&T test result relied upon by the Appeals Board to uphold the 
termination of Officer Becker is a written hearsay statement within the meaning of 
Section 801 Utah Rules of Evidence which defines hearsays statements as: 
(a) Statement. A "statement" is (1) an oral or written 
assertion or (2) nonverbal conduct of a person, if it is 
intended by the person as an assertion. 
3
 This is another illustration where, had appellant been represented, counsel would have objected to the hearsay 
testimony and statement and attempted to education the Appeal Board regarding competent evidence and appellants 
right to confront witnesses. 
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(b) Declarant. A "declarant" is a person who makes a 
statement. 
(c) Hearsay. "Hearsay is a statement, other than one made by 
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, 
offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted. 
Although hearsay evidence, even if objected to, is admissible in an 
administrative hearing an administrative decision "cannot be based exclusively on 
hearsay evidence," Hoskings v. Industrial Commission of Utah 918 P. 2d 150, 155 
(UT. App 1996) citing Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor Control Comm'n 681 P. 2d 
1224, 1226 (Utah 1984). 
To support the findings of an administrative tribunal "there must be a 
residuum of evidence, legal and competent in a court of law." Hackford v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 358 P. 2d 899, 901 (UT. 1961), Yacht Club v. Utah Liquor 
Control Commission 619 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah 1984). 
In this case there is no residuum of legal evidence that could possibly 
establish a blood alcohol content equal to or exceeding 0.04. 
A decision of an administrative tribunal is deemed arbitrary and capricious 
"if it is not supported by substantial evidence in the record" Save our Canyons v. 
Board of Adjustment 116 P.3d 978, 983(Utah App.2005). 
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POINT m 
THE DENIAL OF APPELLANTS REQUEST FOR CONTINUANCE WAS 
AN ABUSE OF DESCRETION DENYING APPELLANT'S 
CONSTITUTION RIGHT TO A FAIR HEARING AND ADDITIONALLY 
BY RELYING ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE DENIED APPELLANTS 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO CONFRONT WITNESSES 
Post-depravation of employment procedures must comport with due process 
requirements providing for a fair hearing Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. 
Comm'n, 949 P. 2d 746, 753 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). The bare essentials of due 
process mandate adequate notice to those with an interest in the matter and an 
opportunity for them to be heard in a meaningful manner, Chen v. Stewart, 100 
P.3d 1177 (2004 UT). 
Officer Becker did not receive adequate notice of the hearing. There is no 
dispute that the Appeals Board attempted to provide notice of the hearing to 
Officer Becker by registered mail that he did not receive. Likewise, there is no 
dispute that Officer Becker did not receive actual notice of the hearing until the 
morning of the hearing (R. 158). When the Appeals Board became aware that 
Office Becker had not received notice of the hearing until the morning of the 
hearing and had not had an opportunity to subpoena witnesses or retain counsel it 
was an abuse of the Board's discretion to proceed. 
The means a State employs to provide notice "must be such as one desirous 
of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it" Jones 
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v. Flowers 547 U.S 220, (2006) citing Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust 
Co 339 U.S. 306, 315. The adequacy of a particular form of notice is assessed by 
balancing the State's interest against "the individual interest sought to be protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment." Id., at 314. 
In this case an evaluation of the adequacy of notice provided Officer Becker 
prior to the City's decision to conduct a hearing to extinguish his protected right of 
employment is necessary. In Jones, supra, the United States Supreme Court 
considered whether notice to a property owner whose property was about to be 
taken was sufficient when the taking authority became aware that mailed notice 
had failed. Although the taking in Jones, was real property the issue is the same; 
whether due process required by the Fourteenth Amendment was satisfied when 
notice although given as required by statue was known to have failed. The 
Fourteenth Amendment does not distinguish a property interest in employment 
versus a property interest in real property. In its analysis the Jones court indicated 
that "It is unlikely that a person who actually desired to inform an owner about and 
impending tax sale of a house would do nothing when a certified letter addressed 
to the owner is returned unclaimed. The sender would ordinarily attempt to resend 
the letter, if that is practical especially given that it concerns the import and 
irreversible prospecting of losing a house," Jones Id. 
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Like the State in Jones, the City may have made a reasonable calculation of 
how to reach Officer Becker but in this case it knew that Officer Becker did not 
receive adequaite notice of the hearing when it became aware that Officer Becker 
had not received notice until the morning of the hearing (R. p. 157, 158). When 
balancing the city's interest to proceed with an immediate hearing when it knew 
that notice was inadequate to allow Officer Becker to prepare for a meaningful 
hearing the scales must tip in favor of Officer Becker. Officer Becker's Fourteenth 
Amendment right to a meaningful hearing, where he had a statutory right to be 
represented by counsel, subpoena witness, and adequately challenge evidence, 
must outweigh the cities interest to proceed. Under the circumstances of this case, 
it was an abuse of the Appeal Boards discretion not to grant Officer Becker a 
continuance especially since Utah law provided authority for the board to extend 
the hearing period. Section 10-3-1106 (5) (a) (ii) UCA 1953 provides: 
For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under 
Subsection (5) (a) (i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and 
municipality both consent. 
Based on the clearly demonstrated lack of adequate notice and knowing 
Officer Becker's intention at the hearing was to "cover every base possible" and to 
be represented by an attorney (R. p. 157). Chairman Isom did not consider or 
discuss whether Officer Becker had demonstrated good cause for his requested 
continuance. Chairman Isom did not ask the city if it would consent to a 
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continuance based on good cause shown. The record is absent of any objection by 
the city to the request for continuance. The record clearly demonstrates that 
Chairman Isom intended to proceed with the hearing with full knowledge that 
Officer Becker was not prepared to proceed (R. p. 158). After receiving Officer 
Becker's request for a continuance, Chairman Isom only requested confirmation 
that the "letter" had been sent, informing Officer Becker of the hearing. His only 
question to Officer Becker regarding his request for continuance was; "And you 
are not going to meet with your attorney until Wednesday?" (R. p. 158). 
Chairman Isom's statement regarding his decision to proceed with the 
hearing should be interpreted as the ruling on the request for continuance was; 
"You made your appeal immediately. We have 15 days total to 
make our decision. So, regardless, once it's, once it's here we have a 
total 15 days and that ends on the 20th of April." (R. p. 158). 
Chairman Isom was either not aware of or totally disregarded the Appeal 
Boards discretionary authority to extend the 15 day time period up to a maximum 
of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
Had Officer Becker been represented by an attorney there can be little doubt 
that the attorney would have identified Section 10-3-1106 (5) (a) (ii) and 
vigorously argued that "good cause" for the continuance had been established. In 
light of the fact that counsel, had they been present, would not have had 
insufficient time to prepare for the hearing competent counsel would no doubt have 
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requested a stipulation from the City to extend the hearing. Counsel could have 
educated the Appeal Board regarding the legal standard followed by Utah courts 
regarding "good cause." Good cause has been defined by the Utah Supreme Court 
as "to be a "special circumstance" that was beyond the party's control." In the 
Matter of General Determination of Right to the Use of Water v. Olds No. 
20060234 March 21, 2008 (UT. 2008) citing with approval Green River Canal Co. 
v. Olds 110 P. 2d. 666 (UT. 2004). 
Although, appellate counsel realizes that speculation and argument not 
supported by the record is not appropriate, counsel recognizes his obligation to 
establish how the denial of Officer Becker's request for a continuance or right to 
be represented by counsel were harmful and how they would have resulted in a 
different outcome, Lucas v. Murray Civil Service Commission 949 P.2d 746, (UT. 
App. 1997). 
The Appeals Board abused its discretion by failing to grant Officer Becker a 
continuance based on inadequate notice resulting in the denial of Officer Becker's 
constitutional right to a meaningful hearing, including the right to confront 
witnesses against him. Had Officer Becker's motion for continuance been granted 
and Officer Becker had been represented by counsel the arguments set forth in 
Point I further demonstrate how the outcome of the case would have likely been 
different and the necessity for reversal of the decision of the Appeals Board. 
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CONCLUSION 
Whether Officer Becker had alcohol on his breath when he reported for 
work, used alcohol in the past, drank alcohol before going to bed, smelled like 
alcohol when he got to work, or whether he attempted to conceal the odor of 
alcohol from his Sergeant or Highway Patrol troopers does not establish a 
residuum of evidence than can be relied upon to prove that Officer Becker reported 
to work with a blood alcohol content greater than .04. The only issue before the 
Sunset City Appeal Board was whether Officer Becker had a blood alcohol content 
of .04 or greater when he reported for duty. The only permissible evidence that 
should have been utilized by Sunset City pursuant to their policy would have been 
a urine test. Instead the only evidence offered and relied upon to establish a blood 
alcohol level was hearsay testimony of the Sunset City Chief of Police regarding 
"PBT" test results. Because a "PBT" test result is not competent evidence to 
establish blood alcohol content the decision of the Appeals Board should be 
reversed, for this reason alone, as arbitrary and capricious. 
Additionally, and perhaps equally egregious, in light of the fact that it was 
established that Officer Becker did not receive adequate notice of the hearing, is 
the denial by the Appeal Board of Officer Becker's requested continuance for the 
purpose of being represented by counsel so that he could adequately defend 
himself. The Appeal Board proceeded knowing that Officer Becker was not 
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prepared. The Board new that Officer Becker did not receive notice of the hearing 
until the morning of the hearing and that he was not represented by counsel. 
Instead of accommodating Officer Becker the Appeal Board proceeded with the 
hearing effectively denying Officer Becker's constitutional right to a fair hearing. 
To make matters worse the Appeal Board relied solely on the hearsay 
testimony of the Sunset City Chief of Police to establish the blood alcohol content, 
again denying Officer Becker's constitutional right to confront witnesses, and 
affirmed the Chief of Police's decision to terminate by relying on inadmissible 
"PBT" evidence that clearly would have been objected to had Officer Becker been 
represented by counsel. 
For the foregoing reasons the decision of the Sunset City Appeal Board 
should be reversed. Officer Becker should be ordered reinstated, with back pay 
from the date of his termination. The reversal should not contain a remand for 
rehearing because there is now no way to determine Officer Becker's blood 
alcohol content at the time he was originally accused. 
DATED this $1 day of October, 2008. 
Jerrald D. Conder 
Attorney for Appellant 
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UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
Amendments 
Section (1) All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject 
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law, which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any state deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law. 
Section (2) Representatives shall be appropriate among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in 
each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for the President and Vice President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State or the 
members of the Legislatures thereof is denied to any of the male inhabitants of 
such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in 
any way abridge, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime the basis 
representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such 
male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of 
age in such State . 
Section (3) No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or 
elector of President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under 
the United States, or under any State who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any 
State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the 
Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion 
against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may 
be vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability. 
Section (4) The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized 
by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in aid of 
insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or 
emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held 
illegal and void. 
Section (5) The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate 




UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
Article (1) Declaration of Rights 
Section (7) Due Process of Law 





R714-500-4 through 7 
R714-500-4 Instrument Certification 
A. Acceptance: All breath alcohol testing instruments employed by Utah 
law enforcement officers, to be used for evidentiary purposes, shall be 
approved by the department. 
(1) The department shall maintain an approved list of accepted instruments 
for use in the state. Law enforcement entities shall select breath alcohol 
instruments from this accepted list, which list shall be available for public 
inspection at the department during normal working hours. 
(2) A manufacturer may make application for approval of an instrument by 
brand and/or model not on the list. The department shall subsequently examine 
and evaluate each instrument to determine if it meets criteria specified by this 
rule and applicable purchase requisitions. 
B. Criteria: In order to be approved, each manufacturer's brand and/or model 
of breath testing instrument shall meet the following criteria. 
(1) Breath alcohol analysis of an instrument shall be based on the principle 
of infra-red energy absorption, or any other similarly effective procedure 
specified by the department. 
(2) Breath specimen collected for analysis shall be essentially alveolar 
and/or end expiratory in composition according to the analysis method utilized. 
(3) The instrument shall analyze a reference sample, such as headspace gas 
from a mixture of water and a known weight or volume of ethanol, held at a 
constant temperature, or a compressed inert gas and alcohol mixture in a 
pressurized cylinder. The result of the analysis must agree with the reference 
sampled predicted value, within plus or minus 5%, or .005, whichever is 
greater, or such limits as set by the department. For example, if a known 
reference sample is .10, a plus or minus range of 5%=.005 (.10x5 %= .005). 
The test result, using a known .10 solution or compressed inert gas and alcohol 
solution, could range from .095-. 105. 
(4) The instrument shall provide an accurate and consistent analysis of 
breath specimen for the determination of alcohol concentration for law 
enforcement purposes. The instrument shall function within the manufacturers 
specifications of: 
(a) electrical power, 
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(b) operating temperature, 
(c) internal purge, 
(d) internal calibration, 
(e) diagnostic measurements, 
(f) invalid test procedures, 
(g) known reference sample testing, 
(h) measurements of breath alcohol, as displayed in grams of alcohol per 
210 liters of breath. 
(5) Any other tests, deemed necessary by the department, may be required in 
order to correctly and adequately evaluate the instrument, to give the most 
accurate and correct results in routine breath alcohol testing and be practical 
and reliable for law enforcement purposes. 
C. List: Upon proof of compliance with this rule, an instrument may be 
approved by brand and/or model and placed on the list of accepted 
instruments. By inclusion on the department's list of accepted instruments, it 
will be deemed to have met the criteria listed above. 
D. Certification: All breath alcohol instruments purchased for law 
enforcement evidentiary purposes, shall be certified before being placed into 
service. 
(1) The breath alcohol testing program supervisor, hereinafter, "program 
supervisor", shall determine if each individual instrument, by serial number, 
conforms to the brand and/or model that appears on the commissioner's 
accepted list. 
(2) Once an individual instrument has been purchased, found to be operating 
correctly and placed into service, the Certificate of Calibration with the serial 
number of that instrument, shall be placed in a file for certified instruments. 
Certificates of Calibration verifying the certification of any breath testing 
instrument shall be available during normal business hours through the 
Department of Public Safety, more specifically the Utah Highway Patrol 
Training Section, 5681 S. 320 West, Murray, UT 84107. 
(3) The department may, at any time, determine if a specific instrument is 
unreliable and/or unserviceable. Pending such a finding, an instrument may be 
removed from service and certification may be withdrawn. 
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(4) Only certified breath alcohol testing technicians, hereinafter 
"technicians", as defined by Section 7 of this rule when required, shall be 
authorized to provide expert testimony concerning the certification and all 
other aspects of the breath testing instrument under his/her supervision. 
R714-500-5. Program Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing techniques, methods, and programs, hereinafter 
"program", must be certified by the department. 
B. Prior to initiating a program, an agency or laboratory shall submit an 
application to the department for certification. The application shall show the 
brand and/or model of the instrument to be used and contain a resume of the 
program to be followed. An on-site inspection shall be made by the department 
to determine compliance with all applicable provisions in this rule. 
C. Certification of a program may be denied, suspended, or revoked by the 
department if, based on information obtained by the department, program 
supervisor, or technician, the agency or laboratory fails to meet the criteria as 
outlined by the department. 
D. All programs, in order to be certified, shall meet the following criteria: 
(1) The results of tests to determine the concentration of alcohol on a 
personfs breath shall be expressed as equivalent grams of alcohol per 210 liters 
of breath. The results of such tests shall be entered in a permanent record book 
for department use. 
(2) Printed checklists, outlining the method of properly performing breath 
tests shall be available at each location where tests are given. Test record cards 
used in conjunction with breath testing shall be available at each location 
where tests are given. Both the checklist and test record card, after completion 
of a test should be retained by the operator. 
(3) The instruments shall be certified on a routine basis, not to exceed 40 
days between calibration tests, by a technician, depending on location of 
instruments and area of responsibility. 
(4) Certification procedures to certify the breath testing instrument shall be 
performed by a technician as required in this rule, or by using such procedures 
as recommended by the manufacturer of the instrument to meet its 
performance specifications, as derived from: 
(a) electrical power tests, 
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(b) operating temperature tests, 
(c) internal purge tests, 
(d) internal calibration tests, 
(e) diagnostic tests, 
(f) invalid function tests, 
(g) known reference samples testing, and 
(h) measurements displayed in grams of alcohol per 210 liters of breath. 
(5) Results of tests for certification shall be kept in a permanent record book 
retained by the technician. A report of the certification procedure shall be 
recorded on the approved form Certificate of Calibration and sent to the 
program supervisor. 
(6) Except as set forth in paragraph 7 in this section, all analytical results on 
a subject test shall be recorded, using terminology established by state statute 
and reported to three decimal places. For example, a result of 0.237g/210L 
shall be reported as 0.237. 
(7) Internal standards on a subject test do not have to be recorded 
numerically. 
(8) The instrument must be operated by either a certified operator or 
technician. 
R714-500-6. Operator Certification. 
A. All breath alcohol testing operators, hereinafter "operators", must be 
certified by the department. 
B. All training for initial and renewal certification will be conducted by a 
program supervisor and/or technician. 
C. Initial Certification 
(1) In order to apply for certification as an operator of a breath testing 
instrument, an applicant must successfully complete a course of instruction 
approved by the department, which must include as a minimum the following: 
a. One hour of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
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c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.L Summons and Citation/D.U.L 
Report Form. 
d. One and one half hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical 
testing, driving under the influence, case law and other alcohol related laws. 
e. One and one half hours of laboratory participation performing simulated 
tests on the instruments, including demonstrations under the supervision of a 
class instructor. 
f. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
(2) After successful completion of the initial certification course a certificate 
will be issued that will be valid for two years. 
D. Renewal Certification 
(1) The operator is required to renew certification prior to its expiration 
date. The minimum requirement for renewal of operator certification will be: 
a. Two hours of instruction on the effects of alcohol in the human body. 
b. Two hours of instruction on the operational principles of breath testing. 
c. One hour of instruction on the D.U.I. Summons and Citation/D.U.I. 
Report Form and testimony of arresting officer. 
d. Two hours of instruction on the legal aspects of chemical testing and 
detecting the drinking driver. 
e. One hour for examination and critique of course. 
f Or the operator must successfully complete the Compact Disc Computer 
program including successful completion of exam. Results of exams must be 
forwarded to program supervisor and a certification certificate will be issued. 
(2) Any operator who allows his/her certification to expire one year or 
longer must retake and successfixlly complete the initial certification course as 
outlined in paragraph C of this section. 
R714-500-7. Technician Certification. 
A. All technicians, must be certified by the department. 
B. The minimum qualifications for certification as a technician are: 
(1) Satisfactory completion of the operator's initial certification course 
and/or renewal certification course. 
(2) Satisfactory completion of the Breath Alcohol Testing Supervisor's 
course offered by Indiana University, or an equivalent course of instruction, as 
approved by the program supervisor. 
(3) Satisfactory completion of the manufacturer's maintenance/repair 
technician course. 
(4) Maintain technician's status through a minimum of eight hours training 
each calendar year. This training must be directly related to the breath alcohol 
testing program, and must be approved by the program supervisor. 
C. Any technician who fails to meet the requirements of paragraph B, sub-
paragraph (4) of this section and allows his/her certification to expire for more 
than one year, must renew his/her certification by meeting the minimum 





10-3-1106. Discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer --
Appeals — Board — Procedure. 
(1) An employee to which Section 10-3-1105 applies may not be discharged, 
suspended without pay, or involuntarily transferred to a position with less 
remuneration: 
(a) because of the employee's politics or religious belief; or 
(b) incident to, or through changes, either in the elective officers, governing 
body, or heads of departments. 
(2) (a) If an employee is discharged, suspended for more than two days without 
pay, or involuntarily transferred from one position to another with less 
remuneration for any reason, the employee may, subject to Subsection (2)(b), 
appeal the discharge, suspension without pay, or involuntary transfer to a board to 
be known as the appeal board, established under Subsection (7). 
(b) If the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
shall exhaust the employee's rights under that grievance procedure before 
appealing to the board. 
(3) (a) Each appeal under Subsection (2) shall be taken by filing written notice 
of the appeal with the municipal recorder within ten days after: 
(i) if the municipality provides an internal grievance procedure, the employee 
receives notice of the final disposition of the municipality's internal grievance 
procedure; or 
(ii) if the municipality does not provide an internal grievance procedure, the 
discharge, suspension, or involuntary transfer. 
(b) (i) Upon the filing of an appeal under Subsection (3)(a), the municipal 
recorder shall forthwith refer a copy of the appeal to the appeal board. 
(ii) Upon receipt of the referral from the municipal recorder, the appeal board 
shall forthwith commence its investigation, take and receive evidence, and frilly 
hear and determine the matter which relates to the cause for the discharge, 
suspension, or transfer. 
(4) An employee who is the subject of the discharge, suspension, or transfer 
may: 
(a) appear in person and be represented by counsel; 
(b) have a public hearing; 
(c) confront the witness whose testimony is to be considered; and 
(d) examine the evidence to be considered by the appeal board. 
(5) (a) (i) Each decision of the appeal board shall be by secret ballot, and shall 
be certified to the recorder within 15 days from the date the matter is referred to it, 
except as provided in Subsection (5)(a)(ii). 
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(ii) For good cause, the board may extend the 15-day period under Subsection 
(5)(a)(i) to a maximum of 60 days, if the employee and municipality both consent. 
(b) If it finds in favor of the employee, the board shall provide that the 
employee shall receive: 
(i) the employees salary for the period of time during which the employee is 
discharged or suspended without pay; or 
(ii) any deficiency in salary for the period during which the employee was 
transferred to a position of less remuneration. 
(6) (a) A final action or order of the appeal board may be reviewed by the Court 
of Appeals by filing with that court a petition for review. 
(b) Each petition under Subsection (6)(a) shall be filed within 30 days after the 
issuance of the final action or order of the appeal board. 
(c) The Court of Appeals1 review shall be on the record of the appeal board and 
for the 
purpose of determining if the appeal board abused its discretion or exceeded its 
authority. 
(7) (a) The method and manner of choosing the members of the appeal board, 
the number of members, the designation of their terms of office, and the procedure 
for conducting an appeal and the standard of review shall be prescribed by the 
governing body of each municipality by ordinance. 
(b) For a municipality operating under a form of government other than a 
council-mayor form under Chapter 3b, Part 2, Council-Mayor Form of Municipal 
Government, an ordinance adopted under Subsection (7)(a) may provide that the 
governing body of the municipality shall serve as the appeal board. 
Amended by Chapter 19, 2008 General Session 
Amended by Chapter 115, 2008 General Session 
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